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LEGAL HISTORY IN THE IDGH COURTHABEAS CORPUS
0

Dallin H. Oaks*

Chief Justice Marshall declared that courts could resort
to the common law to determine what Congress meant by the
term "habeas corpus" in a federal statute,1 the history of this venerable remedy has played an important role in the Supreme Court.
Over the years, however, courts have moved away from using the writ
of habeas corpus for its historic functions of eliciting the cause of
commitment and compelling adherence to prescribed procedures in
advance of trial2 until today it has become primarily a means by
which one court of general jurisdiction exercises post-conviction
review over the judgment of another court of like authority.3 Despite
this significant change in function, the United States Supreme Court
has continued to support its decisions on questions of post-conviction
review by calling upon the history of habeas corpus during that
period when it was predominantly a pretrial remedy. Whatever view
one may adopt as to the wisdom of these decisions, the results of
the Court's "magisterial historiography" have not been happy for
history. 4 Three decisions of the October Term, 1962, provide prime
examples.

E

VER since

• Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.-Ed.
I. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
2. See generally CHURCH, THE WRIT OF HABEAS CoRPus 2-30 (1884); 9 HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAW 104 (1926); WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY (1960); Cohen, Habeas
Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modem Writ, IS CAN. B. REv. 10, 172
(1940); Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative
Grace?, 40 CAUF. L. REv. 335, 341-61 (1952); Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 244-45 (1965).
3. See, e.g., Pollak, Proposals To Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners
-Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956); Reitz, Federal Habeas
Corpus-Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960);
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1956); Applica-

tion for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review of Sentences in United
States Courts, 33 F.R.D. 363 (1964).
4. The quotation is from MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 313
n.l (1959).
Several recent articles have criticized the Supreme Court's use of legal history. The
most comprehensive of these is Kelly, CLIO and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1964
SuP. CT. REv. 119, 131, which concludes that in the reapportionment, school segregation,
church and state, sit-in, and birth control cases the Supreme Court was supporting its
"libertarian interventionism in the social order" by a "historical technique of adjudication" that "may well be the successor to the sociologically oriented opinion of substantive due process days." The Supreme Court's historical representations in Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), concerning the legislative history of the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1867 are ably criticized in Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867-The Supreme
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To INCLUDE DE Novo DETERMINATION OF FACTS
In Townsend v. Sain 5 a state prisoner souiht a writ of habeas

HABEAS CORPUS

corpus to obtain a federal hearing on a constitutional question that
had already been heard by a state court. Prior decisions had established that federal district courts had the power, on a habeas corpus
petition, to hear testimony on a subject already considered by a state
court.6 Therefore, the principal issue in Townsend was not the court's
power, but rather the court's obligation: Could the district court dispose of the petition by simply reviewing the ·written record from the
state court, or did the federal Habeas Corpus Act7 (first enacted in
1867) require an evidentiary hearing to "try issues of fact anew"? 8
- The historical development of habeas corpus was relevant to this
inquiry because when the 1867 Congress provided that persons
restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitution could
obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, it undoubtedly
intended-except to the extent the legislation provided otherwiseto incorporate the common-law uses and functions of this remedy.
After the usual bow to history, the Supreme Court clarified the extent of the federal courts' authority to hold habeas corpus hearings
by declaring that the district courts have power "to take testimony
and determine the facts de novo in the largest terms" 0 and that "the
power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary."10 On the subject of the courts' obligation, the Supreme Court listed various circumstances in which it held that a federal court "must grant an
evidentiary hearing to a habeas corpus applicant"¼1 detained under
the judgment of a state court.
A. Common-Law Rules Against De Novo Hearing
Responsible students of the problem presented in Townsend
differ over the wisdom, in a federal system, of requiring-or even
Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 31 (1965). Another example of Supreme
Court historiography is discussed in Tefft, United States v. Barnett: "'Twas a Famous
Victory," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 123, 132-33.
5. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
6. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 357 U.S. ~20 (1958); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953); Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955). See generally Bailey, Federal
Habeas Corpus, 45 B.U.L. R.Ev. 161, 167, 169-71, 176-77 (1965).
7. 62 Stat. 964 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964). As far as state prisoners
are concerned, this provision traces its history to Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat,
385.
8. 372 U.S. at 309.
9. Id. at 311.
10. Id. at 312.
11. Id. at 313. The Court listed six situations in which an evidentiary hearing
is required. Ibid.
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permitting-a federal court to hold a trial de novo on factual issues
already resolved in _the state courts. 12 Whatever the merit of the
Court's holding, however, it clearly was not supported by the supposed "common-law understanding" 13 that the Court relied on to
support its conclusion. Authorities on the history and use of habeas
corpus14 mention no "common-law understanding" that a court
hearing a habeas corpus petition could "determine the facts de novo
in the largest terms." 15 Moreover, the Court's holding plainly contradicts a well-known, although out-dated, rule governing the
procedure in habeas corpus. At common law a petitioner was not
permitted to introduce evidence to controvert the truth of a return
filed in response to a writ of habeas corpus.16 Thus, if the return
stated a valid explanation for the confinement-such as the judgment and sentence of a court-the petitioner would remain in
custody. A court hearing a habeas corpus petition obviously would
have no occasion to "determine the facts de novo" so long as the
rule against controverting the jailer's return precluded the prisoner
from challenging the findings or judgment of the committing court.
The Townsend opinion contains no historical discussion to support its assertion about de novo hearings.17 For this purpose, the
Court relied exclusively on the extensive discussion in Fay v. Noia, 18
which was decided the same day as the Townsend case. In a footnote
to the Fay opinion, the Court stated:
In making provision for the trial of fact on habeas (something
that had been left unmentioned in the previous statutes governing federal habeas corpus), the Act of 1867 seems to have
restored rather than extended the common-law powers of the
habeas judge. For it appears that the common-law doctrine of
the incontrovertibility of the truth of the return was subject
to numerous exceptions.19
12. Compare Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963), with Reitz, supra note 3. See generally
Note, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1253 (1963); 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 765 (1959); 68 YALE L.J. 98 (1958).
13. 372 U.S. at 311.
14. See, e.g., CHURCH, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 221-55, 362-85; Chafee, The Most
Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REv. 143 (1952); 1 Hor.nswo&ra,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 227; Fox, Process of Imprisonment at Common Law, 39 L.Q.
REv. 46 (1923); Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. REv. 64 (1902), re•
printed in 2 SELEcr EssAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 531 (1908).
15. 372 U.S. at 311.
16. Commonwealth v. Chandler, 11 Mass. 83 (1814); People ex rel. Ordronaux v.
Chegaray, 18 Wend. 637 (N.Y. 1836); CHURCH, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 166-67; HURD,
HABEAS CoRPus 263-77 (1858). See authorities quoted in note 20 infra.
17. 372 U.S. at 311.
18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The decision is discussed more fully in Part II infra.
19. Id. at 416 n.27.
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Only nvo authorities were cited to support the assertion that there
were numerous exceptions to the doctrine of incontrovertibility, and
both make it clear that the exceptions related almost exclusively to
non-criminal commitments.20 With respect to commitments of persons accused of crime, both authorities are flatly opposed to Mr.
Justice Brennan's suggestion that a court hearing a habeas corpus
· case has a common-law power to re-try factual questions already
settled in courts of proper jurisdiction. Similarly, the important
1816 English statute21-soon duplicated in most American sta.tes22which modified the harsh rule against controverting a return, was
expressly inapplicable to persons "confined or restrained for some
criminal or supposed criminal matter...." 28
There is also ample authority to demonstrate that as late as the
mid-nineteenth century an English prisoner was still forbidden to
controvert the truth of a return given in response to his petition for
habeas corpus. For example, in 1855 a prisoner convicted of a misdemeanor petitioned the Court of Common Pleas for habeas corpus
relief, on the ground that the alleged offense was committed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the inferior court that had convicted
20. Discussing commitments for criminal or supposed criminal matters, HURD,
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CoRPus 270-71 (2d ed. 1876), states that the return "could not
either at common law or under the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II., be controverted
with a view to the absolute discharge of the prisoner." There were "occasional
exceptions," Hurd states (while listing only the subject of bail), "but they rest
upon no well defined principle" and are "impossible to specify." Ibid. With respect
to imprisonments other than for criminal matters, however, the exceptions to the
rule against controverting the return were "governed by a principle sufficiently
comprehensive to include most •.• cases" so that it was "impossible to specify those
[non-criminal cases] in which it could not [b.e controverted]." Id. at 271. The other
authority, 4 BACON, .ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAw 587 (Bouvier ed. 1844), states that "no
one can in any case controvert the truth of the return to a habeas corpus." The only
exceptions cited by Bacon relate to proceedings to determine whether a prisoner
who had been indicted should be admitted to bail, and to a case where a petitioner
was allowed to put in an issue of privilege in opposition to the return by way of
confession and avoidance. Id. at 587-88. INGERSOLL, THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 15-19
(1849), also cited by the Supreme Court but for a different proposition, lists one
other exception: persons allegedly being illegally pressed into overseas military
sei;vice.
21. 56 Geo. 3, c. 100 (1816).
22. See, e.g., Md. Laws 1813, pp. 624-25; N.Y. Laws 1818, p. 298. For a thorough
discussion of the American legislation, see HURD, op. cit. supra note 20, at 277-88.
This remedial legislation was probably meant to provide a means of contradicting
the return of one who held a prisoner without legal process and had a personal
interest in the question of his custody. Where the confinement was based on official
process, these statutes gave "no greater right to inquire into the merits on which
the process of commitment is founded, than was allowed by the common law." Bennac
v. People, 4 Barb. 31, 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848).
23. 56.Geo. 3, c. 100, § I (1816). See Ex parte Beechings, 4 B. &: C. 136, 107 Eng, Rep,
1010 (K.B. 1825).
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h~. He offered affidavits in support of his assertions.24 Although
the Courts of Westminster clearly had authority to release prisoners
wrongfully detained by inferior courts,25 this petition was unanimously rejected with the observation that the petitioner's argument
was "as groundless as it is unprecedented." 26 The opinion of Chief
Justice Jervis observed:
[T]he finding of the jury is, that the· prisoner committed the
offense within the jurisdiction of the court, as alleged. He now
seeks to impeach that finding, on the ground that the place
where the offense was actually committed is more than one
thousand yards distant from the boundary of the parish in which
the record alleges it to have been committed. That is not to be
governed by the inquiry whether the fact be indisputable or
othenvise. If we could entertain the application because the
boundary is clearly ascertained, we should be equally bound to
entertain disputes of the most refined and minute character.
The inconvenience of this is manifest. The truth is that the
remedy is not by an application of this sort.27
Just a few years earlier, the Justices of Queen's Bench had refused relief on a similar ground in two noteworthy cases. In the first,
Carus Wilson's Case,28 the jailer's return stated that the petitioner
was held under a legally valid sentence of the Royal Court at Jersey.
For this reason, the court held that the petitioner could not introduce affidavits to show that the lower court had acted inconsistently
with Jersey law.29 Two years later this same ground was employed to
24. In the Matter of Newton, 16 C.B. 97, 139 Eng. Rep. 692 (C.P. 1855).
25. See authorities cited in Collings, supra note 2, at 338 n.14.
26. 16 C.B. at 102, 139 Eng. Rep. at 694.
27. Id. at 101-02, 139 Eng. Rep. at 694. A similar view was expressed in the opinion
of Justice Williams: "If an application of this sort could be entertained, it would be
open to a party, after a lengthened inquiry at the assizes as to whether or not the
alleged offence was committed within the county, to cause himself to be brought up
by habeas corpus, and have the whole matter tried over again upon affidavits. So
monstrous a state of things never could be." Id. at 103, 139 Eng. Rep. at 694.
28. 7 Q.B. 984, 115· Eng. Rep. 759 (1845).
29. "[W]e may decide the question before us by considering the principle of the
exception that runs through the whole law of habeas corpus, whether under common
law or statute, namely, that our form of writ does not apply where a party is in
execution under the judgment of a competent Court. If, indeed, it were proposed
to shew that the prisoner had never been before such Court at all, or that no such
sentence had been in fact given, there might be a difficulty in saying that a traverse
to that effect could not be allowed. But, when it appears that the party has been
before a Court of competent jurisdiction, which Court has committed him for a contempt or any other cause, I think it is no longer open to this Court to enter at all
into the subject matter. If we were to do so, we should constitute ourselves a Court
of Error from such other Court; and should be constantly examining whether the
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deny habeas corpus relief to a petitioner who sought to have the court
review by affidavit whether the Royal Court of Jersey, which had
convicted him of burglary, had authority to sentence him to be
transported.80
In view of the foregoing authority, it is not surprising that neither
Townsend nor Fay refers to any case illustrating the so-called "common-law understanding" by which a court presented with the record
of a hearing in another court of general jurisdiction was supposed to
have held an· evidentiary hearing to develop the facts de novo.
B. Limited Use of De Novo Hearings
There are two early lines of authority on subjects somewhat
related to the issues considered in Townsend and Fay that the Supreme Court might have used to support its assertion of a "commonlaw understanding," but both are of limited applicability and concern a usage of habeas corpus now practically outmoded. A recent
English article refers to several nineteenth century cases in which
courts accepted extrinsic evidence to controvert a return to a writ
of habeas corpus, but those cases involved commitments by courts
of inferior jurisdiction, over whom the scope of review by habeas
circumstances, the existence of which was proved, warranted the opinion which such
Court had formed." Id. at 1008, 115 Eng. Rep. at 769; accord, Case of the Sheriff of
Middlesex, 11 Ad. & E. 273, 292, 113 Eng. Rep. 419, 426 (Q.B. 1840). Of course, habeas
corpus would lie if the order of commitment were illegal on its face, Sec, e.g., The
King v. James, 5 B. &: Ald. 894, 106 Eng. Rep. 1418 (K.B. 1822); Rex v. Collyer, Say.
44, 96 Eng. Rep. 797 (K.B. 1752). See also Queen v. Batcheldor, 1 Per. &: Dav. 516,
537 (1839), where Chief Justice Denman suggested, by way of dictum, that a petitioner
for habeas corpus might be afforded an opportunity to introduce evidence to contro•
vert the return "if the falsehood of the returns were made in any degree probable
before us ••• .'' However, just three years later this same court, with Chief Justice
Denman presiding, held that where a return to a writ of habeas corpus included a
copy of an order which stated that the petitioner had been brought to the bar of
the Court of Chancery and committed for contempt, the petitioner would not be
permitted to controvert this return by affidavits to show that he had never been
brought to the bar of the court at all. Ex parte Clarke, 2 Q.B. 619, 114 Eng. Rep.
243 (1842).
30. Brenan's Case, 10 Q.B. 492, 116 Eng. Rep. 188 (1847). "No objection was made
to the return on the ground that it did not shew jurisdiction in the Court to try
and punish for the crime of burglary: but it was said to be bad for not shewing
that the Court had power to punish by transportation.
"We think, however, that, the Court having competent jurisdiction to try and
punish the offence, and the sentence being unreversed, we cannot assume that it is
invalid or not warranted by law, or require the authority of the Court to pass the
sentence to be set out by the gaoler upon the return. ·we are bound to assume, prima
facie, that the unreversed sentence of a Court of competent jurisdiction is correct;
otherwise we should, in effect, be constituting ourselves a Court of appeal without
power to reverse the judgment.'' Id. at 502, 116 Eng. Rep. at 192,

January 1966]

Legal History in the High Court

457

corpus has always been wider than in the case of superior courts.31
Similarly, when a prisoner applied for habeas corpus before indictment or trial, some courts examined the written depositions on
which he had been arrested or committed,32 and others even heard
oral testimony88 to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to
justify holding him for trial. This procedure amounted to a trial de
novo on the limited issue of probable cause to detain the petitioner
for trial. As noted in an extremely instructive opinion by a Virginia
trial judge, however, the reason a habeas corpus court can look
behind the warrant of a committing magistrate and consider or hear
the evidence on which it is founded is that the magistrate is not a court
of record whose decisions are subject to review by appeal or writ of
error.34 Consequently, neither of the foregoing types of cases is
authority for a trial de novo upon habeas corpus review of the final
judgments of courts of general jurisdiction.
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is not to argue that the
Supreme Court reached the wrong decision in Townsend. Its conclusion that a federal district court, when disposing of a habeas corpus
application, has the power and sometimes the duty to hold a trial de
novo on factual questions already' determined in a state court may
be a sound decision for our time. The limited point urged here is
that when the Court asserted that the 1867 act restored rather than
extended the common-law powers of the habeas judge,35 its assertion
was plainly at variance with the facts of history.
When the writ of habeas corpus performed its ancient function
of eliciting the cause of imprisonment, or of enforcing the right to
31. Rubinstein, Habeas Corpus as a Means of Review, 27 MoD. L. REv. 322, 326-32
(1964). That this same distinction was observed in American courts is apparent from
CHURCH, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 235, 238.
32. See, e.g., The King v. Marks, 3 East 157, 102 Eng. Rep. 557 (K.B. 1802) (petitioners remanded because corpus delicti appeared in depositions though not in
warrant of commitment); Lord Mohun's Case, 1 Salle. 104, 91 Eng. Rep.· 96 (1697)
(court bails prisoner on basis of depositions given at coroner's inquest); Rex v. Dalton,
2 Str. 911, 93 Eng. Rep. 936 (K.B. 1731). But cf. Rex v. Acton, 2 Str. 851, 93 Eng. Rep.
893 (K.B. 1729); Rex v. Greenwood, 2 Str. 1138, 93 Eng. Rep. 1086 (K.B. 1739) (court
· refuses to consider written evidence other than depositions in determining whether
to admit petitioners to bail).
In the leading American habeas corpus decision, Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75 (1807), the Supreme Court considered the evidence in the written
depositions, concluded that no crime bad been committed, and entered an order
discharging the petitioners. See also Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
For a discussion of state-court opinions illustrating this use of the writ, see Oaks,
supra note 2, at 258-59.
33. See United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 412, 413 (U.S. Cir. Ct. 1806).
34. Ex parte Pryor, 3 Quart. Law J. 371, 387-88 (Richmond, Va. Cir. Ct. 1858).
35. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 n.27 (1963), relied on by the Court in Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 (1963).
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bail or to release from confinement under void process prior to trial,
there was seldom, if ever, any circumstance where a court of record
had previously determined any factual issues that were relevant in
the habeas corpus proceeding. The problem of de novo factual hearing by habeas corpus is primarily incident to the use of habeas corpus
as a post-convi~tion remedy-a relatively recent phenomenon. Consequently, the Court would have been more forthright if it had
recognized that ancient habeas corpus history was of little or no
assistance in reaching a decision on an issue involving a relatively
recent function of the writ, rather than claiming support from a
supposed showing that its conclusion really was dictated by-or at
least that it restored-the durable content of the ancient law.
II.

HABEAS CoRPus To R.Evmw ALL "INTOLERABLE RESTRAINTS"

The second case from the 1962 Term, Fay v. Noia, 86 also involved
a state prisoner whose right to a writ of habeas corpus from a federal
court turned on the construction of language in the Habeas Corpus
Act. The issue was whether the provision requiring the exhaustion
of state remedies87 barred relief to a petitioner whose coerced-confession claim, tendered and denied during the state-court trial,88 could
not be reasserted in the state courts because he had failed to seek
a direct appeal within the statutory time limit. This is another question on which capable lawyers will differ. Its resolution should tum
on a matter of legislative interpretation and-to the extent that the
words of the act permit judicial innovation-on a consideration of
the appropriate relationship between state and federal courts in our
federal system. However, almost half of the Court's opinion is
devoted to a far-ranging "preliminary inquiry into the historical
development of the writ of habeas corpus,''80 which concludes with a
well settled proposition that was not in issue and not mentioned in
either brief: 40 that habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to challenge a conviction procured by a coerced confession.
Although unnecessary and immaterial, the Court's historical exegesis was not meaningless, since the Court used it to construct a
conclusion or rule of great potential significance in future habeas
36. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
37. 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (1964).
38. For an account of the testimony heard by the jury in the trial of Noia and
his co-defendants, see United States v. Murphy, 127 F. Supp. 689 (N.D.N.Y. 1955),
39. 372 U.S. at 399.
40. See Brief for Petitioner and Brief for Respondent, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. !191
(1963).
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corpus litigation.41 According to Mr. Justice Brennan, "history refutes
the notion that until recently the writ was available only in a very
narrow class of lawless imprisonments."42 The true function of the
·writ, he declared, "has been to provide a prompt and efficacious
remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. . . .
Vindication of due process is precisely its historic office."43 Elsewhere
he referred to "the common-law principle that restraints contrary to
fundamental law, by whatever authority imposed, could be redressed
by writ of habeas corpus"44 and to "the historic· office of the Great
Writ to redress detentions in violation of fundamental law.'' 45
Habeas corpus, it would seem, has always been a judicial thunderbolt
for enforcing the dictates of natural law.
A. Historical Development of the Writ
Legal historians46-even those cited in the opinion47__:_hold a
view that is at odds with the historical analysis in the Fay case. They
emphasize that the writ originated as a mesne process by which courts
compelled the attendance of parties whose presence would facilitate
their proceedings. Even in the early part of the fifteenth century,
habeas corpus was still being used as an ancillary writ in conjunction
with ·writs of certiorari, privilege, and audita querela. The first
recorded instance of habeas corpus being used as an independent
remedy is toward the beginning of the sixteenth century. That
century and the succeeding one saw a fierce struggle in which the
courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas sought to establish their
jurisdictional supremacy over the courts of Chancery and the Exchequer, as well as special courts like the Privy Council, Admiralty,
Requests, and High Commission. The writ of habeas corpus cum
causa proved to be an extremely effective weapon in this struggle.
According to Holdsworth, the common-law courts could use this writ
41. A portion of the Court's historical discussion was material-that bearing on
the meaning of the 1867 act, which authorized habeas corpus for federal prisoners.
For a persuasive argument that the Court's conclusion-that Congress meant to
authorize broad federal habeas corpus review of all state criminal convictions-is
"inherently implausible" and "without historical foundation," see Mayers, supra note 4.
42. 372 U.S. at 402-03.
43. Id. at 401-02.
44. Id. at 408.
45. Id. at 412.
46. See authorities cited supra notes 2 &: 14.
47. The summary to follow above is taken principally from HOLDSWORTH, op. cit.
supra note 2, WALKER, op. cit. supra note 2, INGERSOLL, op. cit. supra note 20, and Cohen,
supra note 2. Each of these except Cohen was cited by Mr. Justice :Brennan, who seems
to l,lave been notably unselective in his citation of authorities. E.g., 372 U.S. at 408 n.16,
423 n.33.
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to "bring before themselves and release persons who had been imprisoned by one of these rival courts, if, in their opinion, the court
had acted in excess of its jurisdiction."48
The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which was used independently to inquire into the cause of detention in both criminal
and civil cases, was perfected during the seventeenth century. That
its growth was gradual is apparent from a number of cases in the
early 1600's in which persons imprisoned by the Crown or by the Privy
Council were unable to secure release by habeas corpus even though
the return to the ·writ stated no reason for their confinement.40 The
availability of the ·writ as an effective remedy for executive detention
not based on common-law process was not resolved, even in theory,
until 1641. In that year an act of Parliament abolished the Star
Chamber, eliminated or curtailed the jurisdiction of various councils,
and authorized issuance of the writ of habeas corpus by King's
Bench or Common Pleas for persons imprisoned by the command
of the King, the Privy Council, the Council Board, or any successor
to the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber.60
The effect of certain exceptions in the 1641 act, considerable
doubts about which courts or judicial officers had jurisdiction to
issue the writ of habeas corpus, and various devices employed to
avoid the effect of the ·writ, all united to permit continued infringements on the personal liberty of the subject51 and to necessitate the
important reforms in the famous Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.li2 But
that act, for all its renown, was essentially a reform of habeas corpus
procedures· and jurisdictions. It merely clarified which courts or
judicial officers could issue the writ, empowered judicial officers to
issue it when courts were not in session, and established rules to
govern the practice incident to the writ and to prevent its evasion.li 8
The act contained no enlargement of the types of confinements for
which the writ could issue. In fact, it clearly exempted from the
48. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 227.
49. See generally 6 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 31-40 (1924): WALKER, op,
cit. supra note 2, at 57-74: Cohen, supra note 2, at 33-34, 38.
50. 16 Car. 1, c. 10, § 8 (1641). Discussions of this act may be found in WALKER, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 75-76; Cohen, supra note 2, at 172-74.
51. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 115; WALKER, op. cit. supra note
2, at 76-82.
52. 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679). A discussion of this act appears in Cohen, supra note 2,
at 183-96; Oaks, supra note 2, at 252-53.
53. Ibid. See also DICEY, LAw oF THE CoNm'l1JTION 216-19 (9th ed. 1939), "Still
this statute, although recognizing no new principle, put into more practical shape
the remedy already well known, and marks an important period in the extending
usefulness of the writ." INGERSOLL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 7.
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benefits of the ·writ persons committed for "felony or treason plainly
expressed in the warrant of commitment" and "persons convict or in
execution by legal process." 54
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 apparently satisfied the need of
that time, for the law in this area remained relatively static for the
next century and- a half. The general rule, as stated by Lord Campbell in an 1860 opinion denying habeas corpus relief to a person
convicted of a criminal offense, was that
a writ of habeas corpus, to the expediency of granting which
we have also directed our attention, is not grantable in general
where the party is in execution on a criminal charge, after
judgment, on an indictment according to the course of common
law.66

B. Misinterpretation of Bushell's Case
Mr. Justice Brennan did not discuss this gradual development in
the uses of the writ of habeas corpus. In fact, he asserted that over
the years "the nature and purpose of habeas corpus have remained
remarkably constant," 66 a fitting and necessary foundation for his
assertion that the "historic office" of this writ was to vindicate "due
process" or "fundamental law" or to "provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. "67 To support this assertion, the Court offered three authorities: an ambiguous dictum in a famous 1670 contempt case in
Common Ple<!-s,68 an obscure and unsupported statement in Bacon's
Abridgment,69 and a bill introduced in the House of Commons in
1593 but never passed. 60
This triumvirate gives but fragile support for the Court's farreaching conclusion. The combination of authority is primarily
noteworthy for the fact that this was apparently the best the Court
54. 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 3 (1679).
55. Ex parte Lees, El., Bl. &: El. 828, 836, 120 Eng. Rep. 718, 721 (Q.B. 1860). See
also cases discussed in text accompanying notes 24-30 supra. For a summary of the
habeas corpus law of this period, see Collings, supra note 2, at 337-38.
56. 372 U.S. at 402.
57. Id. at 401-02.
58. Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). See 372 U.S. at
403-05.
59. 4 BACON, op. cit. supra note 20, at 585-86. See 372 U.S. at 405. The Supreme
Court once said of this same passage of Bacon's that "when applied to imprisonment
under conviction and sentence, [it] is confined to cases of clear and manifest want of
criminality in the matter charged, such as in effect to render the proceedings void."
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879).
60. Bill introduced in 1593 and quoted in WALKER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 44-45.
See 372 U.S. at 402.
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could assemble for an opinion whose text and voluminous footnotes
bespeak prodigious research.
The weight to be given to the short passage in Bacon's Abridgment and to the abortive legislation is apparent without discussion.
But the true significance of the Court's use of the landmark decision
in Bushell's Case, 61 which it offered as an example of the use of
habeas corpus to relieve from an "intolerable" judicial restraint, 02
requires some discussion.
Bushell's Case involved a writ of habeas corpus issued by Common Pleas for a juror im.prisoned by the Court of Sessions for
contempt after he and his eleven colleagues voted to acquit certain
defendants, allegedly ignoring the manifest weight of the evidence.08
In its discussion of this case, the Supreme Court stated:
Nor is it true that at common law habeas corpus was available only to inquire into the jurisdiction, in a narrow sense, of
the committing court. Bushell's Case is again in point. Chief
Justice Vaughan did not base his decision on the theory that
the Court of Oyer and Terminer had no jurisdiction to commit persons for contempt, but on the plain denial of due
process, violative of Magna Charta, of a court's imprisoning
the jury because it disagreed with the verdict. 64
The Court then quoted extensively from Busheil's Case0G and Bacon's
Abridgment,66 and concluded that at the time when the Constitution
was adopted and the Judiciary Act67 first conferred habeas corpus
jurisdiction upon federal courts, "there was respectable common61. Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
62. Sec 372 U.S. at 403.
63. For an engaging account of the background of this famous case, sec Deutsch,
Hugh Latimer's Candle and the Trial of William Penn, 51 A.B.A.J. 624 (1965).
64. 372 U.S. at 404.
65. "[W)hcn a man is brought by Habeas Corpus to the Court, and upon retorn
of it, it appears to the Court, That he was against Law imprison'd and detain'd,
.•• he shall never be by the Act of the Court remanded to his unlawful imprisonment, for then the Court should do an act of Injustice in imprisoning him, de novo,
against Law, whereas the great Charter is Quod nullus libet homo imprisonetur
nisi per lcgem terrac •••• This is the present case, and this was the case upon all
the Presidents [precedents] produc'd and many more that might be produc'd, where
upon Habeas Corpus, many have been discharg'd ••••
"This appears plainly by many old Books, if the Reason of them be rightly taken,
For insufficient causes are as no causes retorn'd; and to send a man back to Prison
for no cause rctom'd, seems unworthy of a Court." Id. at 404-05.
66. "[I]f the commitment be against law, as being made by one who had no
jurisdiction of the cause, or for a matter for which by law no man ought to be
punished, the court are to discharge him • • • ; and the commitment is liable to the
same objection where the cause is so loosely set forth, that the court cannot adjudge
whether it were a reasonable ground of imprisonment or not." Id. at 405, (Emphasis
added by the Supreme Court.)
67. I Stat._ 73, 81-82 (1789).

January 1966]

Legal l[istory in the High Court

463

law authority for the proposition that habeas was available to
remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to fundamental law." 68
There are several interesting aspects to this conclusion. First,
it is striking that the single case the Court offered to demonstrate
the use of habeas corpus to release a person convicted of a crime in
violation of "fundamental law" or "due process" was a case where
the prisoner had been committed for contempt. This signifies more
than the probable absence of directly applicable authority. A contempt case is not even properly analogous on this point for, as
clearly indicated in the Bushell opinion itself, English courts could
exercise a far broader scope of review when examining a commitment for contempt than when considering commitments for treason
or felony. 69
Second, it is questionable whether the portion of the Bushell
report quoted by the Supreme Court is even a part of Chief Justice
Vaughan's opinion. The quoted passages are from the second of
two collections of briefs of cases appearing at the end of the report
and are preceded by the title: "Presidents [precedents]. That the
Court of Common Pleas, upon Habeas Corpus, hath Discharg'd
Persons Imprison'd by other Courts, upon the Insufficiency of the
Retom only, and not for Privilege." 70
Third, as indicated in the above title and in portions of the
original passage edited out in the version quoted by the Supreme
Court, the true subject of the quoted passage is whether Common
Pleas could issue its writ of habeas corpus for a person imprisoned
by another court when there was no issue of privilege. The absence
of some issue of privilege is significant because Bushell's Case arose
at a time when the Common Pleas judges and other authorities
were actively debating whether that court could issue the writ of
habeas corpus in a circumstance other than the jurisdiction expressly
granted in the Star Chamber Act, or the familiar situation where
habeas corpus was an ancillary remedy to enforce some litigant's
"privilege" to have his case heard exclusively in Common Pleas.71
68. 372 U.S. at 404-06. Cf. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1879), wherein the
Court stated that the Bushell court "discharged the prisoners, on the ground that
their conviction was void, inasmuch as jurymen cannot be indicted for rendering
any verdict they choose."
69. See text accompanying note 82 infra.
70. Vaughan at 154, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1015.
71. See Jones's Case, 2 Mod. 198, 86 Eng. Rep. 102~ (C.P. 1676); 1 HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAw 202-03 (1931). The controversy was ended by the Hapeas
Corpus Act, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679), which dearly gave Common Pleas independent
jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus in a criminal case.
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In this context, it appears highly unlikely that the author of the
quoted passage assumed the heavy and unnecessary burden of
demonstrating that the writ of habeas corpus could be used to
"remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to fundamental
law." All the author had to do-and all the title and language of
the passage indicate that he purported to do-was to answer the
disputed question whether Common Pleas could issue a writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in a case not involving privilege
where the respondent's return to the writ did not set out sufficient
cause for the petitioner's detention.
Fourth, the language quoted from the Bushell report to the
effect that the writ of habeas corpus was used to discharge persons
"against Law imprison'd and detain'd, . . . whereas the Great
Charter is Quod nullus libet homo imprisonetur nisi per legem
terrae" 72 was not understood by sixteenth and seventeenth century
authorities to grant a general license to remedy restraints intolerable under some vague standard of justice or natural or "fundamental" law. A passage from Sir Edward Coke's Institutes discussing
Magna Charta in relation to personal liberty as enforced by the
writ of habeas corpus provides insight into the contemporary
significance of such phrases as "due process of law" and "against
Law imprison'd and detain'd." 73 Coke's stated requirements all
concern the formal regularity of the process of commitment and
the authority of the official who signed it. There is nothing in his
72. See note 65 supra.
73. 1 CoKE, 2D INsrITUTES 52-52t (1797 ed.): "Now seeing that no man can be taken,
arrested, attached, or imprisoned but by due processe of law, and according to the
law of the land, these conclusions hereupon doe follow.
"First, that a commitment by lawfull warrant, either in deed or in law, is accounted
in law due processe or proceeding of law, and by the law of the land, as well as by
processe by force of the kings writ.
"2. That he or they, which doe commit them, have lawful! authority.
"3. That his warrant, or mittimus be lawful!, and that must be in writing under
his hand and seale.
"4. The cause must be contained in the warrant, as for treason, felony, &:c. or for
suspition of treason or felony, &c. • • • •
"5. The warrant or mittimus containing a lawfull cause, ought to have a lawful!
conclusion, viz. and him safely to keep, until! he be delivered by law, &:c. and not
until! the party comitting doth further order. And this doth evidently appeare by
the writs of habeas corpus, both in the kings bench, and common pleas, eschequer and
chancery•••.
"By these writs it manifestly appeareth, that no man ought to be imprisoned,
but for some certain cause: and these words, ad subjiciend. et recipiend. <be. prove that
cause must be shewed: for otherwise how can the court take order therein according
to law?"
Coke's preeminence as the most authoritative seventeenth century commentator on
the meaning of Magna Carta is discussed in Kurland, Magna Carta and Constitutional•
ism in the United States, in THE GREAT CHARTER 48, 50-51 (1965).

.
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discussion regarding whether the content of substantive offenses
or even procedures employed ·at the trial squared with "fundamental law" or gave rise to an "intolerable restraint." 74 Similarly,
Holdsworth suggests that although there was "no historical connection between Magna Charta and this writ," nevertheless when
habeas corpus came to be used as an independent remedy in the case
of persons committed to prison by the Privy Council, "men naturally connected it with those clauses of Magna Charta which prohibited imprisonment without due process of law." 75 Holdsworth
also stated:
Due process of law was interpreted by the House of Commons
to mean due process of common law; and Magna Charta and
these later statutes were supposed to prove that arrests by order
of the king or Council were illegal. But we have seen that this
interpretation was never acquiesced in by the crown; and that
the mediaeval protests and mediaeval legislation never succeeded in limiting the large and vague power of the king or
his council to make arrests. 76
The king was obviously desirous of restricting the scope of the
·writ. In contrast, the parliamentary opposition, which was supported
by the common lawyers, wished to utilize the writ as a protective
device to preclude imprisonment without · common-law process.
Finally, in the seventeenth century the uncertain status of the
executive detention power was resolved in favor of the demands of
Parliament, which effected its object by enacting legislation. "[I]t
· is this legislation, which extends from the Petition of Right to 1816,
that has given to the ·writ its great place in our modern constitutional law." 77
If a seventeenth century lawyer ever urged that the function or
office of habeas corpus was the "vindication of due process," 78 he
would undoubtedly have had in mind the use of habeas corpus to
74. The full passage from Coke also seems to explain the meaning of another
passage on which the Supreme Court relied, 372 U.S. at 405 n.14-Hale's terse and
ambiguous phrases "cause for which a man ought not to be imprisond" and imprison•
ment "without lawful or just cause." See 1 CoKE, op. cit. supra note 73, at 52-52t.
Similarly, INGERSOLL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 44, states that "the only inquiry upon
the return under magna charta, from which the writ derived its efficacy, was, whether
the commitment was per legem terrae, that is, by an officer authorized by the law of
the land, for an offence against the law, and for a purpose, and in a form recognized by
the law." See also Dunham, Magna Carta and British Constitutionalism, in THE GREAT
CHARTER 20, 28, 34-36 (1965).
75. 9 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 71, at 111, 112 (1926).
76. Id. at 112.
77. Id. at 114.
78. This theory was urged by the Supreme Court in Fay. See 3?2 U.S. at 402.
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review executive detentions and to release persons ·wrongfully imprisoned by the crown. The idea that this phrase from Magna
Charta implies some supervisory review of the acts of judges of
superior courts, or a broad license to "remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to fundamental law" 79 originates in the
United States Reports, not the annals of English history.
Fifth, Chief Justice Vaughan's stated reason for issuing the writ
of habeas corpus in Bushell's Case was merely the insufficiency of
the respondent's return to the writ. The Bushell court gave three
grounds of insufficiency. First, the return did not set out the particulars of the alleged contempt-the evidence against whose manifest
weight the jurors were charged with acting. so This observation of
course suggests a very broad scope of review for courts issuing writs
of habeas corpus. When this aspect of Bushell's Case is compared with
the felony prosecution in Fay v. Noia, however, it is significant that
Chief Justice Vaughan emphasized that this broad reviewing power
applied only to persons committed for contempt. Indeed, if a
respondent's return to a ·writ of habeas corpus stated nothing more
than the fact that the petitioner had been committed for treason
or felony, "this is a sufficient retorn to remand him, though in
truth this is a general retorn." 81 Chief Justice Vaughan explained
the distinction between cases involving felony and those involving
contempt:
The cases are not alike; for upon a general commitment for
treason or felony, the prisoner (the cause appearing) may press
for his tryal, ... and upon his indictment and tryal, the particular cause of his imprisonment must appear, which proving
no treason or felony, the prisoner shall have the benefit of it.
But in this case [involving contempt], though the evidence given
were no full nor manifest evidence against the persons indicted,
but such as the jury upon it ought to have acquitted those
indicted, the prisoner shall never have any benefit of it, but
79. Id. at 405.
80. "But here the evidence given to the jury is not exposed at all to this Court, but
the judgment of the Court of Sessions upon that evidence is only expos'd to us; who
tell us it was full and manifest. But our judgment ought to be grounded upon our own
inferences and undezstandings, and not upon theirs." Vaughan at 137, 124 Eng,
Rep. at 1007.
"Hence it is apparent, that the commitment and retorn pursuing it, being in it self
too general and uncertain, we ought not implicitly to think the commitment was re
vera, for cause particular and sufficient enough, because it was the act of the Court of
Sessions." Vaughan at 140, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1008.
81. Vaughan at 142, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1009. See also text following note 16 supra.

January 1966]

Legal History in the High Court

467

must continue in prison, when remanded, until he hath paid
that fine unjustly impos'd on him, which was the whole end
of his imprisonment.82
The return in Bushell's Case was also held to be faulty for not
stating that the jurors gave their verdict corruptly, knowing that the
evidence against the persons indicted was full and manifest. Since
reasonable men can differ on their evaluation of the same testimony,
the court held that conclusions contrary to those reached by the
court were not contemptuous absent some element of corruption.83
Finally, the return was insufficient because the common law did
not permit courts to fine a jury for going against judicial directions or the evidence in a particular case. The nature of the functions
of judge and jury made it impossible for a judge to give an enforceable direction in this matter or to determine whether such a direction had been disregarded.84
Thus, one searches the Bushell opinion in vain for support of
the proposition for which Mr. Justice Brennan used this famous
case. The ground for issuance of the Vvrit was not some abstract
violation of "fundamental law" or "whatever society deems to be
an intolerable restraint," but simply the fact that the return failed
to set out a sufficient basis for the· commitment. "For," as the very
passage relied on by the Court observes, "insufficient causes are as
no causes retorn'd; and to send a man back to Prison for no cause
retorn'd, seems unworthy of a Court." 85
82. Vaughan at 143, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1010.
83. "I conclude therefore, that this retom, charging the prisoners to have acquitted •
Penn and Mead, against full and manifest evidence first and next, without saying that
they did know and believe that evidence to be· full and manifest against the indicted
persons, is no cause of fine or imprisonment." Vaughan at 142, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1009.
84. "Without a fact agreed, it is as impossible for a Judge, or any other, to know
the law relating to that fact, or direct concerning it, as to know an accident that hath
no subject.
"Hence it follows, that the Judge can never direct what the law is in any matter
controverted, without first knowing the fact; and then it follows, that without his
previous knowledge of the fact, the jury cannot go against his direction in law, for he
could not direct.
"But the Judge, qua Judge, cannot know the fact possible, but from the evidence
which the jury have, but (as will appear) he can never know what evidence the jury will
have, and consequently he cannot know the matter of fact, nor punish the jury for
going against their evidence, when he cannot know what their evidence is. • • •
"Being retum'd of the vicinage, wence the cause of action ariseth, the law supposeth
them thence to have sufficient knowledge to try the matter in issue (and so they must)
though no evidence were given on either side in Court, but to this evidence the Judge
is a stranger." Vaughan at 147, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1012.
85. Vaughan at 156, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1016. Quoted by the Supreme Court in Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 404-05.
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C. Misapplication of Bushell's Case
The seventeenth and eighteenth century law of habeas corpus
posed three insurmountable obstacles to any attempt to use the ·writ
of habeas corpus for the "vindication of due process,"B 6 if that phrase
denotes the sort of "fundamental law" or "intolerable restraint" considerations invoked to free the petitioner in Fay v. Noia. First, as
previously discussed, a general return that the petitioner had been
committed for treason or felony was a sufficient return to a writ of
hab~as corpus. Second, petitioners were forbidden to challenge the
truth of particulars set out in the respondent's return to the writ.
Third, once a person had been convicted by a superior court of
general jurisdiction, a court disposing of a habeas corpus petition
could not go behind the conviction for any purpose other than to
verify the formal jurisdiction of the committing court.B1 In view of
these three limitations, it may be said that practically every kind
of "intolerable restraint" or violation of "fundamental law" that
the twentieth century lawyer might imagine-except an imprisonment without stated legal justification, such as the imprisonment
involved in Bushell-could· be shielded from inquiry by a general
return, a valid judgment, or the rule against controverting facts
set out in the return, and a court would be virtually powerless to
supply a remedy by habeas corpus.BB Concededly, there should be a
remedy for every violation of law involving a person's liberty, and
perhaps in our day the remedy should be through the writ of
habeas corpus. But it is misleading to claim support for this proposition in the holding or language of Bushell's Case.
III.

HABEAS CORPUS To OMIT TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENT OF .
IMMEDIATE AND CONFINING RESTRAINT

Where the history of habeas corpus is concerned, the Supreme
Court has also had its sins of omission. In Jones v. Cunningham, 80
the question was whether a state prisoner who had been released on
86. 372 U.S. at 402.
87. See notes 29 and 55 supra. American cases on this subject are discussed in Oaks,
Habeas Corpus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 243, 261-64 (1965).
88. See generally Rubinstein, supra note 31, at 325-26. "Superior courts do not have
to enumerate or specify the grounds upon which the imprisonment is founded; nor
does this have to be done in the return to the writ. Consequently, the opportunities
to find fault with the 'cause shown' are almost nil.... Superior and other common
law courts enjoy, therefore, an almost complete immunity froni review on habeas
corpus." The scope of review was of course Wider where the pris6ncr had been com•
mitted by an inferior court. Ibid.
89. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
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parole was "in custody in violation of the Constitution," 90 so that
he could attack the validity of his conviction by a federal writ of
habeas corpus directed to the parole board.
If there was any single feature that characterized the writ of
habeas corpus in both its early statutory and common-law forms, it
was the requirement that adult petitioners be subject to an immediate and confining restraint on their liberty.91 Early state court
decisions in this country were in agreement that the Habeas Corpus
Act "evidently alluded to persons who were within the four walls
of a prison" and that it "did not relate to persons who were not
actually in custody or imprisoned, or who were out on bail."92 The
Supreme Court relied on these state court opinions in its 1920
decision that a prisoner who had been released on bail, "being no
longer under actual restraint, . . . was not entitled, to the writ of
habeas corpus." 93 Lower federal courts appear to have followed this
rule almost unanimously in bail cases up to the present day. 94
Similarly, once the practice of releasing prisoners on parole became
current toward the end of the nineteenth century, the courts appear
to have been almost unanimous in holding that a writ of habeas
corpus could not be maintained to test the validity of a conviction
after a petitioner had been so released.95
90. 28 U.S.C. § 224l(c)(3) (1964).
91. See, e.g., Palmer v. Forsyth, 4 B. & C. 401, 402, 107 Eng. Rep. 1108, 1109 (K.B.
1825) where a writ of habeas corpus was quashed because the custodian "had no power
at all over the body of the defendants." See 4 BACON, op. cit. supra note 20, at 471. In
situations where the writ sought was the cum causa, which was used to obtain review
of a case before a higher court, the courts seem to have been less exacting in the
custody requirement. See Mitchell v. Mitchinham, 2 Dow!. & R. 722 (K.B. 1823).
92. State v. Buyck, 2 Bay 563, 564 (S.C. 1804). See Dodge's Case, 6 Mart. 569 (La.
1819); Respublica v. Arnold, 3 Yeates 263 (Pa. 1801); Logan v. State, 3 Brev. 415 (S. C.
1814). Cf. State ex rel. Ellerbe, in re Daniel, 39 Ala. 546 (1865); Ex parte Lee, 39 Ala.
457 (1864) (no habeas corpus review of regularity of duty assignments of military personnel); Cox v. Gee, 60 N.C. 516 (1864). But cf. Ex parte Badgley, 7 Cow. 472 (N.Y.
1827), where it was held that a petitioner can be "discharged" by habeas corpus from
one cause of imprisonment even though the respondent can validly detain him for
another.
93. Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339, 343 (1920).
94. See Allen v. United States, 349 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1965) (motion for relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255); Matysek v. United States, 339 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1964) (same); cases
cited in 17 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 808 (1963) and 15 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. R.Ev. 153 (1960). Contra,
United States ex rel. Shott·v. Tehan, 337 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. granted sub
nom. Tehan v. Shott, 381 U.S. 923 (1965). Bailey, Federal Habeas Corpus, 45 B.U.L.
R.Ev. 161, 186 n.105 (1965), states that the petitioner in Tehan was free on bail, although
the opinion makes no mention of this fact.
In Allen v. United States, supra, the court distinguished Jones v. Cunningham on
the ground that the parolee involved there was subject to far more restrictions on his
freedom than a· person who is at large on bail.
95. See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957) (motion for relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); cases cited in Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608 (4th Cir.
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The classic illustration of the principle involved in the bail and
parole cases is the Supreme Court's own 1885 decision in Wales v.
Whitney. 96 That case involved a habeas corpus petition by a naval
officer who sought relief from the following order by the Secretary
of the Navy: "You are hereby placed under arrest, and you will
confine yourself to the limits of the City of Washington." 97 In
holding that this restraint was not the type of "restraint or imprisonment suffered by a party applying for a writ of habeas corpus, which
is necessary to sustain the 1vrit,"98 the Court relied on some early
bail cases and stated:
Something more than moral restraint is necessary to make a
case for habeas corpus. There must be actual confinement or
the present means of enforcing it. . ..
It is said in argument that such is the power exercised over
the appellant under the order of the Secretary of the Navy.
But this is, we think, a mistake. If Dr. Wales had chosen to
disobey this order, he had nothing to do but take the next or
any subsequent train from the city and leave it. There was no
one at hand to hinder him. . . . The fear of ... [being arrested
and returned to the District], which may or may not keep Dr.
Wales within the limits of the city, is a moral restraint which
concerns his own convenience, and in regard to which he exercises his own will.Do
Relying on the foregoing authorities, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that the 1vrit of habeas corpus was not
available to the parolee in Jones v. Cunningham. 100 The Supreme
Court reversed. Although Mr. Justice Black "looked to commonlaw usages and the history of habeas corpus both in England and
in this country," 101 he chose his precedents from among recent decision involving aliens seeking entrance to this country, and commonlaw decisions under which the 1vrit was issued to liberate wives or
minor children "not under imprisonment, restraint or duress of any
kind."102 The Court held that the principles allowing habeas corpus
release in these cases were applicable to the "significant restraints"
1961), retld, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). Contra, Ex parte Snodgrass, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep, 359,
65 S.W. 1061 (1901); cases cited note 106 infra (decided after Jones v. Cunningham),
96. 114 U.S. 564 (1885).
97. Id. at 566.
98. Id. at 571.
99. Id. at 571-72.
100. Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 871 U.S. 236 (1963),
The petitioner was seeking :relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
101. 371 U.S. at 238.
102. Id. at 239. The history of habeas corpus as a remedy in child custody disputes
is discussed in Oaks, supra note 87, at 270-74.
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imposed on the petitioner by his parole board.103 Then, without so
much as mentioning the bail and parole cases, or even its own decision in Wales v. Whitney,1 04 which involved a remarkably similar
restraint, the Court concluded: "While petitioner's parole releases
him from immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions
which significantly confine and restrain his freedom; this is enough
to ~eep him in the 'custody' of the members of the Virginia Parole
Board within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute." 105
As in the cases of Townsend and Fay, the result reached in Jones
v. Cunningham may be a sound decision for our time and circum- ·
stances.106 Recent state-court decisions show a trend toward modifying
the traditional custody requirement.101 But whatever the wisdom of
such modification, the Supreme Court's statement that its decision
in Jones v. Cunningham was supported by the "history of habeas
corpus both in England and in this country" falls considerably short
of complete accuracy.1os
It may be that we know too much of legal history already. In
103. Petitioner had been directed to live with his aunt and uncle in a certain community. He could not change his residence, leave the community, or own or operate
a motor vehicle, without the permission of a parole officer to whom he was required
to report regularly. 371 U.S. at 242.
104. Cf. Kurland, Foreword to The Supreme Court-1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv.
143, 170 (1964). Inexplicably, even the state's brief in this case failed to cite Wales v.
Whitney. Brief for Respondent, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). The
Petitioner's brief distinguished Wales on the basis of what was at best an alternative
ground of decision: being subject to military orders, petitioner could have been confined to Washington by a lawful directive pertaining to his military duties, so that the
order in question placed no added restraint on his liberty. Brief for Petitioner, 28-29,
Jones v. Cunningham, supra. Despite the presence of this alternative ground, a consideration of the Wales opinion as a whole shows that the Court's holding was not
limited to petitioners in the military.
105. 371 U.S. at 243.
106. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 213 A.2d 613 (Pa. 1965), a well
reasoned and erudite opinion expressly modifying the law to permit a prisoner to use
the writ of habeas corpus to attack the validity of a final judgment of conviction even
though he has not yet begun to serve the sentence imposed. Accord, Martin v. Commonwealth, 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965). Recent decisions permitting a person to use
habeas corpus to test the validity of a sentence from which he has been· paroled
include People ex rel. Zangrillo v. Doherty, 40 Misc. 2d 505, 243 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup.
Ct. 1963); Garnick v. Miller, 403 P .2d 850 (Nev. 1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Alexander
v. Rundle, 213 A.2d 644 (Pa. 1965). For a discussion of some modem reasons for
modifying the traditional requirement of custody as a prerequisite for habeas corpus,
particularly in cases like Jones v. Cunningham where the petitioner was in custody
when he initiated his petition for the writ, see 59 MICH. L. REv. 312 (1960).
107. 371 U.S. at 238.
108. In discussing Jones v. Cunningham, a note in 51 CALIF. L. REv. 228, 230
(1963), suggests that "it was somewhat misleading to resort to historical usages .to
define the meaning of 'custody' for purposes of postconviction review" because,
"historically, the Great Writ was primarily a pretrial device to prevent the arbitrary
imprisonment of an individual without bringing him to trial."
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certain comers of the law, "ignorance is the best of law reformers." 10o
If we are to use history in legal opinions, however-and it is difficult
to make any use of precedent without involving history to some
extent-we must avoid getting facts twisted by wishful thinking
or "innocently motivated after-mindedness." 110 As one perceptive
scholar has observed, "the historian, unlike the brief-1vriter, can
never proceed on the assumption that history unfolds backward in
neat legal categories; his task, whatever his opinions on the merits
of contemporary policies, is to analyze the past on its own terms." 111
This ideal was not realized in the "historical" discussions in the
three important habeas corpus decisions of the 1962 Term, which
established a new scope of factual inquiry ("de nova"), a vague new
extension of the legal grounds for issuance of the '\\Trit ("detentions
in violation of fundamental law"); and a new and practically allencompassing definition of the custody that will suffice to qualify
for issuance of the writ ("conditions which significantly confine and
restrain freedom").
Few students of the law object to a court's reshaping old remedies to fit new and growing social problems, so long as the court
moves within the interstitial area governed by what Karl Llewellyn
called the "law of leeways." 112 But the legal rules fashioned to cover
such growth should be cloaked in reason, not garbed in a regal
patchwork of history that, on close examination, proves as embarrassingly illusory as the Emperor's new clothes.
109. HOLMES, Tm: COMMON LAw 78 (1881), quoted in WEINER, UsES AND ABUSES OF
LEGAL HISfORY: A PRACTITIONER'S VIEW 4 (1962).
110. See WEINER, op. cit. supra note 109, at 9.
Ill. Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man With Soul So Dead,"
1963 SuP. Cr. R.Ev. 325, 326. In Kelly, CUO and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1964
SUP. Cr. REv. 119, 155, the author discusses numerous important areas of recent
Supreme Court adjudication to support his thesis that the Court "has confused the
writing of briefs with the writing of history."
112. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 219-20 (1951); LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE
BUSH 156-57 (1951 ).

